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Characterization and Disease: Homosexuals
and the Threat of AIDS
A joke in bad taste: "What's the hardest thing about telling your
mother you have AIDS? Persuading her you're Haitian."'
The historical legacy of the oppression of gay men has been grounded and
based in law.2 Unlike other minorities, gays do not possess any instantly recog-
nizable characteristics that would betray their homosexual identities to a hostile
society. The safety of a hidden identity-"the closet," in homosexual lexicon-
precludes any urgent need to assert their rights as gay individuals.
The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic has stripped
away the protections of "the closet." Those individuals diagnosed with the dis-
ease must confront the additional trauma of having their sexual identities ex-
posed to the heterosexual world. Gays who do not have the disease avoid the
test for the causative virus, fearing that a positive test result will serve as a
"surrogate marker ' 3 for their homosexuality. Furthermore, AIDS victims who
are not homosexual are stigmatized by suspicions about their sexuality. As the
metaphors surrounding AIDS become more entrenched, it becomes increasingly
difficult to prevent society's attitude towards homosexuality from permeating its
response to AIDS.
This Note discusses the manner in which society may shape its characteri-
zation of a threatening disease, and then traces the development of the identifica-
tion of AIDS with homosexuality. In that context, the Note then addresses the
effect that the recent United States Supreme Court decision on sodomy laws may
have on the legal responses to the epidemic and argues that the disease may be
utilized as a justification for the enactment of oppressive restrictions under the
guise of public health measures. Finally, the Note concludes that although legis-
lative and judicial responses to AIDS are in the seminal period, they foreshadow
a counterrevolution against tolerance for minority rights.
I. SOCIETY AND THE CHARACTERIZATION OF DISEASE
In her study of the social conceptions of disease, Susan Sontag argued that
each individual is born holding a dual citizenship in both the world of wellness
and the world of illness. 4 Although these two worlds are mutually exclusive, an
individual inhabiting one sphere is always aware of the other's existence. The
sick want to return to the sphere of wellness, and those who enjoy a state of good
1. D. ALTMAN, AIDS IN THE MIND OF AMERICA 58 (1986).
2. Orland & Wise, The AIDS Epidemic: A Constitutional Conundrum, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv.
137, 151 (1985) (AIDS Symposium Issue).
3. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 79 (attributing appellation of "surrogate marker" to Rodger
McFarlane of the Gay Men's Health Crisis, New York City, who stated that a list of HIV antibody
positives would in essence be a list of sexually active gay men).
4. S. SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 3 (1978).
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health guard against its loss.5 These desires are rooted in the instinct for self-
preservation.
When a society is threatened by an outbreak of contagious disease, a con-
flict arises between the interests of the sick and the well. The ill seek care and a
cure; the healthy want protection from exposure to the disease. Each side looks
to the society's legal structures to preserve its interests. The AIDS epidemic is a
manifestation of this conflict. The AIDS sufferer may expect the legal system to
protect his individual civil rights until the medical community can discover a
cure. The healthy, on the other hand, may insist that there is an obligation to
eliminate the risk of infection even if it requires an impairment of the rights of
AIDS carriers. The balance that the legal structure strikes between the conflict-
ing interests is often determined by society's characterization of the disease.
The exclusivity of the states of sickness and health is illustrated by the fre-
quent futility of efforts of the sick to articulate the nature of physical discomfort
and pain which are the symptoms of their illness. The experience of pain is a
phenomenon that cannot be adequately described to the world outside of the
afflicted body. Pain has the effect of "shattering" language. 6 The sufferer can
only rely on inaccurate metaphors drawn from tangible reality to articulate his
experience: pain is described as "dull," "throbbing," "piercing."' 7 Even at the
basic level of physical experience, illness begins to carry metaphorical and sym-
bolic associations. Metaphor is the only means through which the ill person can
communicate the reality of his physical condition. Yet the separation between
the spheres of the sick and the well is so complete that these efforts largely fail:
"To have pain is to have certainty; to hear about pain is to have doubt."'8 The
sick individual becomes isolated from an external world that is unable to verify
his physical experience.
When the external world does respond to an individual's sickness, it may be
that society is reacting to its own associations with the disease, not that the
sufferer has been able to communicate the reality of his condition. Certain ill-
nesses can achieve a status wherein the healthy believe that they comprehend the
experience of the disease. These diseases share common traits that arouse a
sense of dread in the healthy: an unknown mode of transmission, the lack of a
cure, and the perception that the disease is contagious. 9 Sontag noted that the
reference to death elevates these diseases to the level of "master illnesses." The
descriptive metaphors used to communicate the nature of these particular ill-
nesses are far more profound than the ones used to describe the symptoms. The
disease becomes a metaphor for death itself.' 0
Sontag's study, first published in 1978 prior to the identification of AIDS,
5. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 3.
6. E. SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 5 (1985).
7. See generally id. at 3-11 (discussing the inability to articulate accurately the physical sensa-
tions experienced by one's own body; Scarry's argument emphasizes the political and social exploita-
tion of pain).
8. Id. at 13.
9. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 5-7.
10. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 18.
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compared historical reactions to tuberculosis with contemporary responses to
cancer. Both diseases, with no known mode of transmission, were thought to be
incurable. With both diseases, acute fear led to the belief the illness was, in some
sense, morally if not literally "contagious." ' I The metaphor shrouding each ill-
ness was that of death caused by passion. In the case of tuberculosis, the cause
was thought to be an excess of passion; 12 with cancer, the genesis of the disease
was linked to the repression of passion.1 3 These diseases were seen as an expres-
sion of the character of their victims.14 Furthermore, infection with these dis-
eases was characterized as punitive. The illness was nature's retribution on the
individual for possessing the very characteristics that "caused" the disease.'
5
AIDS, a " 'master illness'" like cancer and tuberculosis, 16 has been "'used
to propose new, critical standards of individual health, and to express a sense of
dissatisfaction with society as such.' "17 AIDS has been linked to sexuality and
blood and is, therefore, particularly susceptible to metaphorical use.1 8 Popular
conceptions view AIDS as caused by individual characteristics of excess, imbal-
ance, and defiance of socially approved forms of sexuality.' 9 Some view AIDS,
like cancer and tuberculosis, as a disease caused by passion. The AIDS sufferer
can trace the cause of the disease to the expression of those very passions that
society has long sought to repress.
In his comprehensive study of the history of Western sexuality, the French
philosopher Michel Foucault traced the development of three explicit legal
codes-the canon, the Christian pastoral, and the civil laws-to govern all sex-
ual practices. 20 These codes defined licit and illicit behavior using the matrimo-
nial relationship as the central reference point. The early codes regulated
practices within marriages; but in the nineteenth century lawmakers began to
abandon these inquiries and scrutinized only practices outside the marital rela-
tionship.21 These practices, such as sodomy, sadism, and necrophilia, were set
apart and viewed as "unnatural," and of these "sodomy was held to be the great-
est sin against nature."
'22
Historically, society has reacted with unusual vehemence when the diseased
are infected through the very practices that have set them apart from the com-
munity before the onset of the illness. The separateness of the sphere of the ill
11. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 6.
12. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 20-21. Sontag argues that tuberculosis became so romanticized
that popular beliefs attributed creativity and a heightened awareness and sensitivity to its victims.
Id. at 26-33.
13. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 20-21. Sontag then compares popular beliefs about cancer
victims, whose illness is believed to stem from repression of their "true" feelings. Id. at 20-26.
14. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 46-48.
15. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 46-48.
16. Dolgin, AIDS: Social Meanings and Legal Ramifications, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 193, 197
(1985) (quoting S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 72-73).
17. Id. (quoting S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 72-73).
18. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 194.
19. Dolgin, supra note 16, at 72.
20. M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 37 (1978).
21. Id. at 37-40.
22. Id. at 39.
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thereby has become more complete. This has been particularly true during
epidemics of venereal diseases, wherein the death metaphor is enhanced with
symbols of pollution, contamination, and dirt.23 The disease becomes
politicized. 24 The community transfers the metaphors associated with the disfa-
vored group to the disease. Furthermore, the illness is thought to be caused not
only by individual transgressions, but also by an attitude of permissiveness in
society at large.25 For example, in the early years of this century, popular opin-
ion held venereal disease to be rooted in the tolerance of the immigrant element
in the new industrial society.
26
This attitude surfaced in the conflict over the cause of AIDS, which peaked
before the identification of the human immunovirus (HIV). One research theory
was that AIDS was caused by a single, mutant virus; a second theory espoused
multifactorial causation. 27  The latter, called the immune-overload theory,
viewed AIDS as a response to frequent infection by already known organisms.
A victim's constant exposure to these organisms through "promiscuous" sexual
activity caused a general suppression or "overload" of the immune system.
28
This theory verged on seeing AIDS as self-inflicted 29 and betrayed the research-
ers' moralistic viewpoint. 30 How the infected person had chosen to live his life
allegedly caused the disease. Causation was rooted in going to bathhouses and
being sexually promiscuous.3 1 At the other extreme, researchers arguing for a
single "new" or "mutant" virus theory of causation were supposedly amoral in
their approach.3 2 AIDS was a mutant virus and the gay community had the
misfortune, the "bad luck," to be the first host.33  These theories-one which
blamed the sick for illness and the other of which deemphasized any individual
responsibility-are indicative of the sexual characterizations that shaped the
early definitions of AIDS.
The increasing identification of AIDS with male homosexuality has led to
greater scrutiny of the gay community by medical researchers and the media-
indeed, by society as a whole. Heightened fears have surfaced in a community
unaccustomed to such attention and already threatened by a mortal illness.
23. A. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 5 (expanded ed. 1987).
24. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 10-12.
25. See A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 131.
26. A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 22-23.
27. See D. BLACK, THE PLAGUE YEARS 105-32 (1986) (discussing the history of the develop-
ment of the conflicting theories); see also D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 47-57 (discussing, in general,
the effect of politics on AIDS research, and, specifically, homophobia as a critical influence on the
early stages of scientific research); Fain, Coping with a Crisis: AIDS and the Issues It Raises, THE
ADVOC., Feb. 17, 1983, at 15 (discussing the gay community's perspective on the conflicting
theories).
28. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 42.
29. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 42.
30. D. BLACK, supra note 27, at 105.
31. D. BLACK, supra note 27, at 105.
32. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 42.
33. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 42 (arguing that the school of thought espousing 'the pure
misfortune" that AIDS surfaced in the gay community essentially denied any individual responsibil-
ity in contracting the disease).
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Such fears were justified by a respected commentator's suggestions that "[w]e
need to entertain the mystical and find the link between Haitians and gays with
AIDS . .. in their common tendency to conjure up those dark forces science
holds at bay by pretending they don't exist."'3 4 As Sontag has warned, what
"we," the society at large, will find in this "mystical" search will bear no relation
to science but will be the metaphors of death, illness, and homosexuality that
"we" placed there.3 5 Sontag's warning, and a general understanding of how
society often characterizes disease, may provide a useful background for discus-
sion of the specific medical and legal issues that have arisen with respect to
AIDS.
II. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND THE CHARACTERIZATION OF AIDS AS A
HOMOSEXUAL DISEASE
A leading epidemiologist has suggested that the collection of medical data is
an attempt to understand the mysteries of life and death by systematically or-
ganizing the ravages of disease into comprehensible structures: "One epidemic
resembles the next. The cases are always counted, the dead still listed: humans
have an extraordinary sense of macabre administration.
'3 6
The identification of AIDS3 7 began at New York University Hospital in
1979 when a physician treated two young men in succession for Kaposi's sar-
coma, a rare skin cancer. The treating physician was puzzled because neither
patient belonged to the risk group commonly identified with the cancer-elderly
men of Mediterranean origin. He noted, however, that both men were homosex-
ual although he drew no conclusion from the fact.
38
In 1981, a Center for Disease Control (CDC) examination of a ledger re-
cording the distribution to hospitals of an antibiotic used exclusively for
Pneumocystis carinii, a common organism causing serious pneumonia only in
patients whose immune functions are deficient, revealed an abnormal incidence
of five patients in the Los Angeles area.3 9 The five were young homosexual men
with no known reason for experiencing immune deficiency. The CDC began
official documentation of this immune deficiency syndrome in its report on the
Los Angeles statistics. 40 Four weeks later, in July 1981, the CDC began track-
ing the incidence of Kaposi's sarcoma and tracing its relationship to Pneumocys-
tis pneumonia (PCP).4 1 In the early months of 1982, researchers firmly
established the link between the incidence of the disease and homosexual activ-
34. D. BLACK, supra note 27, at 66.
35. S. SONTAG, supra note 4, at 53-55.
36. J. LEIBOWITCH, A STRANGE VIRUS OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN 92 (1985).
37. See generally Choi, Assembling the AIDS Puzzle: Epidemiology, in UNDERSTANDING
AIDS 10-19 (V. Gong ed. 1985) (discussing the on-going search for the cause and cure of AIDS).
38. J. LEIBOWITCH, supra note 36, at xv.
39. J. LEIBOWITCH, supra note 36, at xv-xvi; see D. ALTMAN, supra note I, at 32.
40. Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 250,
250-52 (1981).
41. Kaposis Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men-New York City
and California, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 305, 305-08 (1981) [hereinafter
Kaposi's Sarcoma].
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ity.4 2 Although the CDC initially used the terms Kaposi's sarcoma and PCP,
the homosexual stamp was affixed to the disease by popular usage of the acro-
nym GRID-Gay-Related Immune Deficiency.43  In rapid succession, how-
ever, the CDC documented the incidence of the disease among intravenous drug
users,44 Haitians, 4 5 hemophiliacs,4 6 blood transfusion recipients,47 infants,4 8
and the female sexual partners of afflicted males.4 9 In a September 1982 report,
the CDC adopted the appellation Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS),50 a descriptive name less pejorative towards gay victims and less stig-
matizing to those AIDS sufferers who are not gay.5' However, references to the
"gay plague" in the popular press increased as hysteria in the general population
began to mount in 1983.52 The fact that the first recorded cases occurred exclu-
sively among gay men affected the entire future conceptualization of AIDS.
5 3
Scientific inquiry, however, required the characterization of the victims into
groups-at-risk. The study of AIDS was the study of behavior, and only by ex-
amining the practices of the affected groups could researchers identify the mode
of transmission of the disease. Early recommendations for limiting the transmis-
sion of the disease antedated the identification of the HIV virus as the causative
agent. Behaviorial studies examining health care providers and their exposure
to bodily fluids such as saliva and sweat were breakthroughs in determining how
42. Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 507, 507-08, 513-14 (1982); see also Update on Kaposi's Sarcoma and
Opportunistic Infections in Previously Healthy Persons-United States, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WEEKLY REP. 294, 300-01 (1982) [hereinafter Update on Kaposi's Sarcoma] (documentation of
the occurrence of Kaposi's sarcoma and PCP in previously healthy persons); Diffuse, Undifferenti-
ated Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma Among Homosexual Males-United States, 31 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. 277, 277-79 (1982) (identification of non-Hodgkins lymphoma in homosexual
men); Persistent, Generalized Lymphadenopathy Among Homosexual Males, 31 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. 249, 249-52 (1982) (documentation of the occurrence of unexplained, persis-
tent, generalized lymphadenopathy among homosexual men); Follow-Up on Kaposi's Sarcoma and
Pneumocystis Pneumonia, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 409, 409-10 (1981) (update
on Kaposi's sarcoma and PCP in homosexual men in New York City and California); Kaposi's
Sarcoma, supra note 41, at 305-08 (report on homosexual men with both Kaposi's sarcoma and
PCP).
43. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
44. Update on Kaposi's Sarcoma, supra note 42, at 300-01.
45. Opportunistic Infections and Kaposi's Sarcoma Among Haitians in the United States, 31
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 353, 353-4, 360-61 (1982) [hereinafter Opportunistic
Infections].
46. Pneumocystis Carinii Among Persons with Hemophilia A, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 365, 365-67 (1982).
47. Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-Califor-
nia, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 652, 652-54 (1982).
48. Unexplained Immunodeficiency and Opportunistic Infections in Infants-New York, New
Jersey, California, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 665, 665-67 (1982).
49. Inmunodeficiency Among Female Sexual Partners of Males with Acquired Immune Deft-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS)-New York, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 697, 697-98
(1983).
50. Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, supra note 42, at
507.
51. See D. BLACK, supra note 27, at 60 (attributing this idea to Dr. James Curran of the CDC).
52. See D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 58-65 (discussing examples of discrimination against
homosexuals because of popular beliefs about AIDS).
53. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
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the disease was not transmitted. 54 A comparison of the behavioral practices of
those diagnosed to the lack of evidence of any transmission to health care work-
ers culminated in the finding that the disease is transmitted primarily through
sexual activity and through the exchange of blood or blood-containing secre-
tions. This, in turn, led to the conclusion that the risk of transmission through
casual contact was nonexistent.
5 5
However, if such classification was successful in defining the means of
transmission of AIDS, the stigmatization of the characterized "risk groups"
continued after the evidence eliminated the risk of infection through casual con-
tact. The brief history of the documentation of the Haitians as an identified risk
group raises questions about the methods and effects of statistical
characterization.
In 1982, researchers first identified recent Haitian immigrants to the United
States as a high risk group for AIDS.5 6 An immediate controversy accusing the
CDC of racial and socio-economic bias surrounded the classification of an entire
nationality as a risk group.5 7 However, the lack of any identifiable behavioral
characteristics precluded inclusion of many of the Haitian cases in any of the
existing risk categories.5" Haitian authorities asserted that there was no scien-
tific basis to classify a nationality as being at risk for AIDS. The CDC prevailed
by arguing that proper epidemiological evaluation required the creation of the
category because the empirical subjects denied participating in any previously
classified risk behavior while the incidence of AIDS cases per population unit
was much higher in the American Haitian community than in the population of
the United States as a whole.5 9
The CDC's argument reflected a lack of insight into Haitian culture. In
this devastatingly poor, predominantly Catholic, totalitarian state, there was lit-
tle tolerance for homosexuality, and a high percentage of Haitian males practic-
ing homosexual prostitution did not consider themselves gay.60 Later studies
revealed that a disproportionate number of Haitian AIDS cases came from Car-
refour, a suburb of Port-au-Prince, which was a center of male and female pros-
titution frequented by many tourists, including American gays.6 1 Under
54. Prospective Evaluation of Health Care Workers Exposed Via Parenteral or Mucous-Mem-
brane Routes to Blood and Body Fluids of Patients with AIDS, 33 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 181, 181-82 (1984) [hereinafter Prospective Evaluation]; Prevention of AIDS: Report
of Inter-Agency Recommendations, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 101, 101-04
(1983); AIDS: Precautions for Clinical and Laboratory Staffs, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 577, 577-80 (1982).
55. See An Evaluation of AIDS Reported in Health Care Personnel, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WEEKLY REP. 358, 358-60 (1983); Prospective Evaluation, supra note 54, at 181-82.
56. See Opportunistic Infections, supra note 45 at 360-61.
57. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 71-73 (discussing the fact that while the classification of the
other groups-at-risk was based on common behavioral practices with diagnosed AIDS cases, Hai-
tians were classified as a group-at-risk for simply sharing the same nationality as diagnosed AIDS
patients. Altman notes the Haitians were the only risk group identified by who they were rather
than what they did).
58. Vieira, The Haitian Link, in UNDERSTANDING AIDS 93 (V. Gong ed. 1985).
59. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 72.
60. Vieira, supra note 58, at 94.
61. D. BLACK, supra note 27, at 67-68.
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mounting political pressures, 62 and supported by the recent evidence of sexual
transmission and the growing awareness of the reluctance of Haitian men forced
into prostitution by economic necessity to identify themselves as homosexuals,
63
the CDC abandoned the classification of Haitians in 1985.64
Their identification as an AIDS risk group had a devastating effect on the
Haitian population. Haitians in the United States "were literally targeted: poor,
black, contagious immigrants."165 The reaction of the non-Haitian populations
living in close proximity to the "contagious" people, who were often unpro-
tected illegal aliens, led to employment discrimination, housing eviction and-in
the case of intercepted "boat people"-impoundment. 66 In Haiti, the rapid de-
cline of the tourist industry led to a widely publicized press release from the
Duvalier government which stated that Haiti would no longer serve as the
brothel of the Caribbean.67 Haitian officials began arresting and jailing native
homosexuals while expelling foreign gays.
68
The CDC's classification of Haitian nationals as a risk group, vilified by one
commentator as an example of "North American semantic carelessness," 69 also
undermined the epidemiological structure of the early AIDS studies. The final
CDC update before the declassification of Haitians attributed 3.8 percent of all
AIDS cases to unknown or "uncharacteristic" factors. 70 The next update cited
an increase to 6.7 percent in the uncharacteristic category, 7 1 which reflected
statistical evidence drawn from the Haitian population that the CDC was either
unable, or had simply failed, to evaluate properly.
The positive impact of behavioral study on classified risk groups is evi-
denced by reported self-behavior modification in homosexual males and attend-
ant lower rates of venereal infection.7 2 Furthermore, the possibility of the
occurrence of new modes of transmission of the AIDS virus seems to preclude
any argument in favor of abandoning the behavioral characterization systems.
73
The CDC's epidemiological structure was undermined only when the behavioral
62. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 72-73.
63. D. BLACK, supra note 27, at 67-68.
64. Update: AIDS-United States, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 245, 245-48
(1985). Statistical evidence from the abandoned Haitian risk category eventually became categorized
in the revised "Heterosexual Cases" (formerly "Heterosexual Contacts") category formulated in
1986. See Memorandum of July 29, 1986, CDC AIDS WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REP. ("This cate-
gory includes all patients without one of the risk exposures higher on the list who have either had
heterosexual contact with a person with AIDS or at risk of AIDS or who were born in countries in
which heterosexual transmission is considered to play the major role.").
65. J. LEIBOWITCH, supra note 36, at 79.
66. J. LEIBOWITCH, supra note 36, at 79.
67. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 72.
68. J. LEIBOWITCH, supra note 36, at 80.
69. Letter from Fritz Cineas, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 668, 668 (1983).
70. Update: AIDS-United States, 33 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 661, 661-64
(1984).
71. Update: AIDS-United States, supra note 64, at 245-48.
72. See, e.g., Update: AIDS in the San Francisco Cohort Study, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 573, 573-78 (1985).
73. See D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 55-56 (discussing the epidemiological study of "link"
theories, including the possible roles of genetic, environmental, and social factors in the transmission
of AIDS).
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core of the classification was abandoned and a Haitian class created. The re-
sponsibility of the scientific community to its research subjects is fulfilled when
the categorization of these subjects is legitimate for scientific purposes. Once an
afflicted individual has been properly classified for epidemiological studies, it is
the function of the legal system to protect that individual. In the context of this
epidemiological background, this Note examines the legal protections that are
implicated by the recent onset of the public health threat engendered by AIDS.
III. AIDS, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Throughout an epidemic, the communities of the ill and the well may turn
to the legal system to protect their conflicting interests. Each issue raised by
AIDS has ramifications beyond the workplace, classroom, or laboratory where
the legal drama is unfolding. Every legal question echoes the ultimate issue of
the epidemic: what limits on the activities of the diseased will the community be
willing to impose?
A. Homosexuals and Constitutional Protection
Although an individual's sexual conduct may, in some instances, be entitled
to substantive due process protection, the United States Supreme Court has not
extended general protection to adult consensual homosexual activity. In Bowers
v. Hardwick,74 the one major decision on homosexual sodomy, the Court took a
highly restrictive view of what substantive due process protection, if any, should
be accorded to adult consensual sexual acts. In Hardwick, a homosexual male
challenged a Georgia statute75 criminalizing the performance of or submission
to an act of sodomy.7 6 The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the
statute. In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Burger stated that there is
"nothing in the Constitution depriving a State of the power to enact the statute
challenged here."'7
7
The Court has used a bifurcated approach in analyzing whether a statute
can be upheld as constitutional on a due process challenge. A statute that inter-
feres with a nonfundamental right need bear only a rational relationship to a
74. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). In August 1982 Michael Hardwick was charged with violating the
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, see infra note 75, by performing an act of oral sex on another
adult male in the bedroom of his own home. Although the district attorney dropped the charges
against him, Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of the statute in federal district court. "John
and Mary Doe," a married heterosexual couple, joined Hardwick in this action, alleging that they
wished to engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute, but the statute and Hardwick's arrest
"chilled and deterred" them from participating in those activities. The district court, however, de-
nied standing to the Does, stating that they had not sustained, nor were they in any immediate
danger of sustaining, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute. Id. at 2842 & n. 2. For a
discussion of the Bowers decision, see Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: An Incomplete Constitutional
Analysis, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1100 (1987).
75. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984). The statute provides that a person commits the offense
of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and
the mouth or anus of another. Such offenses are punishable by imprisonment of not less than one
nor more than 20 years. Id.
76. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
77. Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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legitimate state interest; 78 however, when a statute infringes on a fundamental
right the state's objective must be compelling79 and the statute a necessary and
least restrictive means to the achievement of that end.80 One commentator has
stated that it is the duty of the Court to utilize this analysis to define and defend
the rights of individuals against statutes that represent a majority sentiment
seeking to limit the legal entitlements of unpopular groups.
8 1
The Hardwick Court, however, used precisely such a majoritarian senti-
ment to rationalize its decision to uphold the sodomy statute. Justice White,
writing for the majority, refused to acknowledge Griswold v. Connecticut8 2 and
its progeny as precedent. 83 Griswold recognized a fundamental right to privacy
in the conduct of one's intimate relationships, but the Hardwick court reasoned
that the established privacy rights did not bear "any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy."' 84 The Court was un-
willing to find any fundamental right to engage in sodomy,85 because it had
previously regarded as fundamental only those rights which are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" 86 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tra-
dition."'8 7 The Court believed that it would be "facetious" to find a fundamental
right to engage in sodomy under these tests, because all states outlawed sodomy
until 1961 and twenty-four states maintained criminal sodomy statutes as of the
date of the decision. 88 Justice White further reasoned that the Court would no
longer be inclined to discover new fundamental rights under the due process
clause.
89
The Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick did not differentiate between het-
erosexual and homosexual sodomy.90 Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, argued
that the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to married or unmarried
heterosexual adults.9 ' Thus, the State should have the burden of showing why
78. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
79. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
80. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). Fundamental rights-in particular, those
aspects of "liberty" not enumerated in the Bill of Rights-have been held to include the right to
teach one's child a foreign language, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923); the right to
send one's child to private school, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); and the
right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-2 (1978) (discussing the difficulty in applying this analysis to funda-
mental rights under substantive due process).
81. L. TRIBE, supra note 80, § 15-2, at 892.
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to privacy in the use of contraceptives in marital
sexual intercourse).
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (the right of privacy protects the decision of a
woman and her doctor to abort in the first trimester of pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) (recognizing the right of privacy in the use of contraceptives in nonmarital sexual
intercourse).
84. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
85. Id.
86. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
87. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
88. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2845-46.
89. Id. at 2846.
90. See id. at 2856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
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selective enforcement against homosexuals did not constitute constitutional dis-
crimination.92 Although Stevens' dissent did not specifically address the issue,
his comments raise the possibility that the Court could find such selective en-
forcement a violation of the equal protection clause.93 However, the Court has
never recognized homosexuals as a suspect class 94 and the present Court appears
as unwilling to find new "suspect classes" or "fundamental rights" under the
equal protection clause as it has been under the due process clause. 95 According
to Justice White, "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegiti-
macy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."'96
Gay rights advocates were outraged by the Hardwick decision. Thomas
Stoddard, Executive Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
has accused the Hardwick majority of utilizing an unprincipled distortion of the
actual issue presented before the Court in a zealous effort to tailor the disposi-
tion of the case to suit its particular prejudices. 97 Stoddard's argument rests
upon the limited scope of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit's decision on appeal to the Supreme Court. The court of appeals in re-
versing and remanding the district court's dismissal, had merely charged the
State of Georgia with proving a compelling interest in the prohibition against
sodomy; the court of appeals never ruled on the actual issue of the constitution-
ality of the statute.98 Stoddard argued that the Court's decision was beyond the
scope of the actual appeal and indicated the majority's eagerness to rush forward
to the ultimate question of the statute's constitutionality. The Hardwick deci-
sion thus may have exceeded the restrictions placed on the Court's appellate
jurisdiction when it proceeded to uphold the statute in the absence of any lower
ruling on the issue. Furthermore, the Court issued its decision in the absence of
any trial record identifying the particular state interest that the statute was in-
tended to protect.99 Stoddard also attacked the Hardwick majority for con-
verting a "sexual privacy case" to a "gay rights" case, arguing that this
recharacterization allowed Justice White to avoid a precedential analysis under
the Griswold progeny'0° and permitted the Court to uphold the sodomy statute
with the simple reasoning that proscriptions against such conduct have "'an-
92. Id. at 2858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. The Court applied a two-tiered approach in equal protection analysis. Only a classification
based on a suspect class, such as race or national origin, or which impairs a fundamental right, such
as the right to vote, is subject to the strict scrutiny test, in which the classification must be a limited,
necessary means to promote a compelling state interest. See L. TRIBE, supra note 80, §§ 16-1 to 16-7
(discussing model for judicial review of challenges to statutes under equal protection clause).
94. See Orland & Wise, supra note 2, at 151.
95. Orland & Wise, supra note 2, at 148-57; see also Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent
by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648 (1987) (arguing that the Hardiwick Court character-
ized its decision as judicial restraint employed to counteract the perceived excesses of the "personal
lawmaking" of the Warren Court).
96. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
97. Stoddard, supra note 95, at 655.
98. Stoddard, supra note 95, at 651.
99. Stoddard, supra note 95, at 651.
100. Stoddard, supra note 95, at 652-53.
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cient roots.' "101
Although the decision is narrowly limited to the holding that states may
proscribe homosexual activity without violating substantive due process, Hard-
wick indicates that the Court is unsympathetic to the assertion of gay rights and
is unlikely to hold discrimination against homosexuals unconstitutional. 10 2 Gay
men would be at a severe disadvantage in seeking constitutional protections
against actions undertaken to combat AIDS, because such restrictions are justi-
fied as being aimed at "disease carriers" and not at a particular sexual orienta-
tion.' 0 3 These "public health" actions may go directly to the core question of
whether the state criminalizes homosexual conduct. For example, in Baker v.
Wade 104 "Dallas Doctors Against AIDS" sought to set aside a judgment of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which declared
the Texas sodomy statutes unconstitutional. 10 5 This group of "concerned physi-
cians" urged the court to reopen the evidence to allow the introduction of evi-
dence of AIDS as a public health reason to uphold the sodomy statutes.'
0 6
Several months before the Supreme Court delivered the Hardwick decision,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated
in dictum in Randall v. Alcohol & Mental Health Association 10 7 that it was not
unconstitutional to be gay. Although the Hardwick majority expressed its ab-
horrence of homosexual practices, the decision did not address the status of
homosexuals as individuals under the Constitution. 10 8 By failing to address this
issue, the Court has, in essence, created targets for those who would use the
AIDS epidemic to persecute the homosexual community.
Because AIDS is still perceived to be "a gay men's disease,"'1 9 the epi-
demic may be used to justify homophobic attitudes in society. For example,
testimony at a House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing on Criminal Justice
demonstrated that "AIDS Backlash" was a factor in the significant increase in
101. Stoddard, supra note 95, at 654. (quoting Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844).
102. Orland & Wise, supra note 2, at 151-53.
103. Orland & Wise, supra note 2, at 153.
104. 106 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
105. Id. at 527-28.
106. Id. at 528-30. The motion of the doctors' group to set aside a final judgment was denied
because the AIDS-related "evidence" they sought to introduce did not constitute "newly discovered
evidence" that could not have been discovered with due diligence in time to move for a new trial, nor
was the "new evidence" sufficient to warrant a new trial or to change the result as required by FED.
R. Civ. P. 60(b). Baker, 106 F.R.D. at 531.
107. No. 85-4910, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1986) (court dismissed plaintiff's § 1983 action
which alleged that defendant nurse was required to be screened for AIDS because he was dispensing
medication to plaintiff).
108. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2847-49 (Powell, J., concurring). Although Justice Powell agreed
that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, he believed that the respondent
was protected under the eighth amendment and that a prison sentence for engaging in such consen-
sual acts would create a serious eighth amendment issue. The majority, however, did not address the
implications of the Georgia statute for an individual who engages in the proscribed acts; rather, the
decision only addressed the ability of the State to proscribe such conduct. Id.
109. See AIDS Perceived "Gay Men's Disease," AIDS PoL'y & L., Oct. 22, 1986, at 6, col. I
(discussing issues raised at a 1986 Women and AIDS conference held in Boston, Mass.).
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anti-gay violence in 1985.110 An eight-city study of homophobic violence
showed that twenty percent of gay men had been the victims of physical assaults
and, in at least eight percent of the reported incidents, the perpetrators allegedly
made verbal reference to AIDS.111 A representative of the American Psycho-
logical Association testified that the increase in violence against homosexuals "is
'apparently fueled by public reaction' to AIDS."''1 2
The epidemic has also made homosexuals vulnerable to those who seek to
use AIDS to further their political agendas. For example, on May 1, 1987, an
aide to Reverend Jerry Falwell disclosed that the Moral Majority was going to
purchase broadcasting time to " 'expose the myths and the cover-up of the facts
about the AIDS epidemic.' "113 In a related letter, Reverend Falwell attributed
the "'original spawn'" of the AIDS epidemic to homosexuals and alleged that
"'powerful militant homosexuals'" have extended their "'wretched [political]
influence' " to extract a "'cover-up'" about the disease and to prohibit public
health officials from "'doing what needs to be done' "-mandatory testing and
quarantine-to halt the spread of" 'the gay plague.' 114
Hardwick raises further questions about the state's ability to perform its
public health duty to prevent the further transmission of AIDS. The Surgeon
General of the United States has urged comprehensive educational programs as
the best defense against proliferation of the disease.' 1 5 These educational pro-
grams emphasize that individuals must adapt their sexual practices to reduce the
risk of transmission. A state that criminalizes sodomy is faced with a dilemma:
how can the state effectuate its public health duties when a pragmatic and effec-
tive undertaking of this duty requires the state to address modified adaptations
of behavior it criminalizes? The question is raised whether Hardwick could be
used to justify shifting the burden of public health education from the state to
the private sector.
The characterization of AIDS as a gay disease has confused the issue of the
legal entitlements of homosexuals with the separate question of the limits and
restrictions that may be imposed on the carriers of contagious disease. The ulti-
mate question is whether those courts justifying restrictions to prohibit the fur-
ther transmission of the disease will be alert to attempts to attack homosexuals
through restrictions masquerading as public health measures. In the face of a
public backlash created by the AIDS epidemic and the continuing threat of the
disease itself, gay men will be forced to trust and rely on the sensitivity of the
courts and the legislatures to distinguish the disease from the homosexual. As-
suming, arguendo, that this distinction is made, courts must distinguish the ap-
parent lack of protections to which the homosexual is relegated under the
110. AIDS Said Cause of Rise in Violence, AIDS POL'Y & L., Oct. 22, 1986, at 6, col. 2.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Gregory Herek of the American Psychological Association).
113. Falwell Plans TVProgram to Expose AIDS "Cover-Up, '" AIDS Po.'y & L., May 6, 1987, at
5, col. 1 (quoting an unnamed aide to Rev. Jerry Falwell).
114. Id. (quoting a fund-raising letter from Rev. Falwell).
115. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (1986).
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Court's decision in Hardwick from their duty to scrutinize the legitimacy of all
public health measures undertaken to combat AIDS.
B. AIDS and Quarantine
The most drastic protective measure available to a community is the impo-
sition of a complete restriction on the movement of an infected individual. The
term "quarantine" literally means "forty days" and stems from the Renaissance
practice of a forty-day detention of ships from plague-ridden ports. 11 6 The prac-
tice, however, dates back to Biblical edicts mandating that the "unclean" shall
live alone, dwelling outside of the camp, during the period of infection."t
7
Early American case law established preservation of the public health as a
proper concern of state legislatures. Quarantine was held to be a legitimate exer-
cise of the state's police power, even to the extent of depriving individuals of
their constitutional guarantees of liberty." 8 In a 1905 decision, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts,' 19 the Supreme Court ratified the police power of the states over
issues of public health. The Court, in holding compulsory smallpox vaccination
of adults to be constitutional despite infringement on personal liberty, asserted
that individual liberty must yield in the face of the state's right "'to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.'"120 The Court further
recognized, in dicta, the right of the state to impose even the most stringent
requirements, including quarantine, in order to protect public health.' 2' Ac-
cording to the Court, the only limitation on the state's power was that the state
could not act arbitrarily or oppressively.'
22
The Jacobson decision is typical of the minimum review applied by early
twentieth century courts in cases involving both economic and civil rights in-
fringements: the legislation was presumed valid unless it bore no reasonable
relationship to a proper governmental goal. 123 The State could establish a rea-
sonable relationship, even though the legislature reacted solely on the basis of a
common belief about the transmission of the disease. A court required no evi-
dence establishing the validity of the belief. 1
24
116. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv.
53, 55 (1985).
117. Leviticus 13:46.
118. See Parmet, supra note 116, at 55-71, for a comprehensive summary of American case law
from the colonial era to the early years of the twentieth century.
119. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
120. Id. at 26 (quoting Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1878)).
121. Id. at 29 ("An American citizen, arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during
the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, although apparently free from
disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on board of
such vessel or in a quarantine station, until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due
diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has
disappeared.").
122. Id. at 28.
123. See Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 380 (1915) (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) and Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) for the proposition that the Court may
uphold state statutes restricting work hours for women on challenges that such statutes violated
liberty of contract).
124. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
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In the early twentieth century the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit addressed the discriminatory potential of quarantine in Jew Ho v.
Williamson.125 The Jew Ho court invalidated a San Francisco city ordinance
quarantining the Asian residential section of the city in response to nine deaths
attributed to an outbreak of bubonic plague. 126 Although contradictory evi-
dence was presented on the existence of bubonic plague in San Francisco,127 the
court ruled that if bubonic plague were shown to exist, a limited quarantine
could be upheld.1 28 The court, however, noted that the boundaries of the quar-
antine were carefully drawn to exclude the residences of white citizens, and held
that the ordinance was a subterfuge for discrimination. 129 The Jew Ho decision
held that a public health ordinance could not be an excuse for discrimination.
The duty of the court was to invalidate "the administration of a law 'with an evil
eye and an unequal hand.'"130
Beyond the Jew Ho proposition barring overt discrimination, courts have
generally granted expansive readings of state powers to prevent the spread of an
infectious disease. 13 1 The quarantine of prostitutes on the presumption that
they carried venereal diseases is an example of the exercise of this power.
132
During the First World War, the Commission on Training Activities instituted a
campaign in the military forces for "moral cleanliness and health" that
culminated in the passage of the Chamberlain-Kahn Act, which established
funds for civilian quarantine and isolation camps as part of a venereal disease
prevention program. 133 From December 1918 to July 1920, twenty-seven
"reformatories" and "dormitories" quarantined 18,000 women convicted of
prostitution. 134 "Hold and treat" statutes and ordinances enabled officials to
hold a woman suspected of venereal infection until she was examined and, if the
examination proved positive, treated.' 35 The possibility of infection was suffi-
cient cause for incarceration. The fact that 15,500 of the 18,000 women commit-
ted tested positive for venereal diseases reinforced the belief that all prostitutes
were infected. Whereas courts may have been sympathetic to less stigmatized
complainants, the "hold and treat" statutes were maintained as bearing a rea-
sonable relation to a proper state objective. 1
36
125. 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id. at 24-26.
128. Id. at 26.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Id. at 23-24 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).
131. Comment, Protecting the Public from AIDS: A New Challenge to Traditional Forms of Epi-
demic Control, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 191, 202 (1986); see also Parmet, supra note
116, at 59-71 (comprehensive survey of cases upholding quarantine laws from early twentieth
century).
132. See A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 84-92 for a detailed narrative.
133. Act of July 9, 1918, ch. 143, § 2, 40 Stat. 845, 886.
134. See A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 88-89.
135. A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 85.
136. Cases concerning prostitutes include Ex parte Clemente, 61 Cal. App. 666, 215 P. 698
(1923) (fact that woman was conducting house of "ill fame" was reasonable ground to believe she
was affected with infectious disease); Exparte Dayton, 52 Cal. App. 635, 199 P. 548 (1921) (woman
who was "inmate" of a brothel was reasonably suspected of carrying infectious disease); Ex parte
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As medical advances developed efficient treatments and preventions for in-
fectious disease, the incidence of quarantine rapidly declined. 137 The current
case law is anchored in the holdings of courts sitting in the early decades of this
century and, thus, should have little precedential value in the AIDS epidemic.
Existing case law has been outdated because courts have adopted more progres-
sive attitudes in evaluating the effects of governmental regulation. Specifically,
most public health law in this country predates the current scope of protected
individual rights.
1 3 8
The law of quarantine, however "anachronistic,"' 139 has been resuscitated
as a means of containing the AIDS epidemic.1 40 As early as 1983, a proposal to
quarantine recalcitrant AIDS patients-diagnosed cases who continued to seek
sexual partners-was drafted by the Chief of Infectious Diseases in Califor-
nia. 14 1 The proposal was dropped after a rash of highly unfavorable press expo-
sure. In Connecticut, publicity about a New Haven prostitute infected with
AIDS resulted in that state legislature's clarification of state quarantine law with
respect to the spread of infectious disease through irresponsible behavior.1 42 In
1985 a public television documentary on AIDS prominently featured the sensa-
tional "Fabian Bridges Case." 143 Controversy and renewed calls for quarantine
legislation erupted after Bridges, a male homosexual prostitute affected with
AIDS, announced that he had continued to have sexual activity.
A widely publicized attempt to enact quarantine proposals occurred in the
Proposition 64 campaign preceding the 1986 California general elections. In
Arata, 52 Cal. App. 380, 198 P. 184 (1921) (woman of "ill fame" reasonably presumed to have
venereal disease). But see Exparte Shephard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 195 P. 1077 (1921) (more than mere
suspicion required to hold an individual in quarantine; therefore, prostitute suspected of infection
was unreasonably detained).
137. See, e.g., A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 170-74 (discussing the discovery of antibiotics-
"magic bullets"--to treat venereal disease and the attendant decline in reasons for officials to be
involved in regulating public morals).
138. Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1274, 1276 (1986).
139. Parmet, supra note 116, at 89.
140. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 63-64.
141. See D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 64.
142. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19(a)-221 (West 1986). The substantially revised section added
provisions for the confinement of a respondent with a "communicable disease" when it is determined
that the person poses a substantial threat to the public health. Id.
In August 1987, the North Carolina General Assembly responded to the AIDS epidemic by
enacting amendments to the existing Communicable Disease Law. Act of Aug. 12, 1987, ch. 782,
§§ 1-21, 1987 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 440 (amending portions of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 130A). The
amendments allow the State to isolate persons with communicable conditions, defined as those indi-
viduals "infected with a communicable agent but without symptoms," id. § 3 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130A-133(5)), in addition to those persons with a communicable disease. The amend-
ments further enable the State to limit the actions as well as the movements of any person exposed to
a communicable disease or condition. Id. § 2 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-133(4)).
Additional language in the provision, which enables public health officials to exercise quarantine and
isolation authority, states that such action will be undertaken "only when and so long as the public
health is endangered, all other reasonable means for correcting the problem have been exhausted,
and no less restrictive alternative exists." Id. § 15 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-145).
The amendment, however, fails to articulate the evidentiary burden of officials seeking isolation
authority and does not provide a statutory time limit on individuals subject to quarantine.
143. Matthews & Neslund, The Initial Impact of AIDS on Public Health Law in the United
States-1986, 257 J. A.M.A. 334, 334 (1987).
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June 1986, the "Prevent AIDS Now Initiative Committee" (PANIC),
spearheaded by supporters of Lyndon LaRouche, successfully petitioned to
place a quarantine proposal on the November ballot. 144 Although public health
experts recognized the proposal as a means to permit the confinement and quar-
antine of individuals who tested positive for the HIV virus, supporters of the
initiative attempted to dress up Proposition 64 as a modest measure employing
only proven public health practices.145 However, the LaRouche national head-
quarters in Virginia printed over one million campaign pamphlets promoting a
theory of AIDS transmission by insect carriers, casual contact, and federal eco-
nomic policies, 146 and the proposal was enthusiastically supported by conserva-
tive politicians such as California House Representative William Dannemeyer of
the House Health Subcommittee. 147 The campaign tactics of the proponents of
Proposition 64 created an immediate controversy. Upon suit by the California
Secretary of State, a California Superior Court judge ordered false information
about the transmission of AIDS stricken from the official Proposition 64 infor-
mation pamphlet that was to be mailed to each of the State's twelve million
voters.' 48 The initiative was attacked by commentators both inside and outside
the State. On October 1, the American Public Health Association announced
that Proposition 64 would deprive individuals of their basic liberties despite a
lack of scientific evidence that the proposed measures would protect public
health. 149 In an editorial entitled "No on [Proposition] 64," the Los Angeles
Times succinctly labeled the initiative as "homophobia disguised as public
health." 150 The bill was finally rejected by a two to one margin after a massive
and coordinated demonstration of opposition by medical experts.' 5' On an-
nouncing the defeat of the proposal, the California State Health Director called
the vote "a triumph, very simply, for good over evil."'
152
However, in the early months of 1987 a similar bill requiring mandatory
disclosure of virus carriers to the Colorado Department of Health was intro-
duced in the Colorado General Assembly. ' 53 This bill was passed by the legisla-
ture and signed by the governor on June 8, 1987.154 The law enables the State
and local health departments to examine and test any individual whom a health
144. LaRouche Trounced on All Fronts but Vows to Keep Trying, AIDS POL'Y & L., July 2,
1986, at 4.
145. Californians to Vote on Adding AIDS to Disease List, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, § 2, at 5,
cols. 2, 3.
146. Measures: AIDS, English-Only and Limits on Pay Put California in Limelight, L.A. Times,
Nov. 2, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
147. Letter to the Editor from H. Rep. W. Dannemeyer, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1986, § 2, at 2, col.
2.
148. See Statements on Proposition 64 Removed, AIDS POL'Y & L., Aug. 27, 1986, at 2.
149. Association Asks Justice to Rescind Opinion on AIDS, AIDS POL'Y & L., Oct. 8, 1986, at 8.
150. No on Prop. 64, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1986, § 5, at 4, col. 1.
151. Toxics: Anti-Pollution Measure Wins Easily; AIDS Initiative Rejected, L.A. Times, Nov. 5,
1986, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
152. Id.
153. Colorado Measure to Allow AIDS Patient "Restriction," AIDS POL'Y & L., Mar. 25, 1987,
at 6.
154. Colorado is Split on New AIDS Law, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1987, § A, at 13, col. 1.
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official "knows or has reason to believe" is infected by the HIV virus.' 5 5 Health
officials may seek a State court order "to take such person(s) into custody, for a
period not to exceed 72 hours, and place him in a facility designated or approved
by the executive director."' 156 Furthermore, the statute allows officials to peti-
tion the courts for orders enabling the State to "restrict" an HIV carrier for a
period of up to three months for failure to comply with a court injunction to
"cease and desist" from practicing unsafe sexual behavior. 157 Although the stat-
ute states that public health officials must justify all petitions for a court order by
"clear and convincing evidence,"' 158 it may happen that individuals who are not
infected by the HIV virus-in particular, individuals such as gay men whose
sexual behavior may raise suspicions in the minds of the public health depart-
ment-could be confined and tested by the State.
Similarly, in December 1986 the Minnesota Department of Health issued a
discussion paper urging the State legislature to modify its statutory disease con-
trol program. The proposal suggested a three-tiered program for noncompliant
HIV carriers who continued to engage in behavior known to transmit the AIDS
virus: the individual would first be monitored and counseled, then assigned to
supervised living quarters, and finally "confined" if he or she persisted in "un-
safe" activities. 159 The Department of Health said that the category of "non-
compliant carriers" could be extended to individuals who refused to be tested for
the virus, and to those persons who exhibited "mental illness" or "sociopathic
tendencies."' 160 Although the Minnesota AIDS Project charged that the propo-
sal was "akin to quarantine" and questioned the necessity of presenting the pro-
gram to the legislature for statutory enactment,' 6 1 an omnibus health bill with
provisions for detaining communicable disease was passed by the Minnesota
State legislature in 1987.162 A spokesperson for the sponsor of the bill addressed
the issue of individual liberties by explaining that the State would not order
testing of any individual and would rely on the carrier's health care provider to
report those patients she suspects to be noncompliant carriers.
163
The enactment of the Illinois Sexually Transmissible Disease Control
Act 164 in September 1987 illustrates a unique strategy to deflect potential ques-
tions about the individual protections accorded under statutory quarantine pro-
visions. Under preexisting law, the Illinois Department of Public Health had
155. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1407(1) (1987).
156. Id. § 25-4-1407(2).
157. Id. § 25-4-1406(2)(c), (3).
158. Id. §§ 25-4-1406(2)(c), 25-4-1407(4).




162. 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 209 (West) (bill allows health commissioner to petition for a
six-month confinement for non-compliant carriers and permits 72-hour emergency "holds" on carri-
ers suspected to be imminent health threats).
163. Perpich Expected to Sign AIDS Detention Material, AIDS PoL'Y & L., May 20, 1987, at 7.
The Minnesota AIDS Project protested that the bill encourages a violation of the doctor-patient
relationship because the burden is on the physician to refer noncompliant carriers to the State. Id.
164. Act of Sept. 21, 1987, Ill. Pub. Act 85-651.
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complete power to order isolation of any infected individuals who endangered
the public health. 165 The new Illinois act-in addition to providing for report-
ing requirements, contact investigation between known carriers of infectious dis-
eases and their sexual partners, physical examination, and confidentiality of
medical information-allows for quarantine "to prevent the probable spread of a
sexually transmissible disease." 166 In his official signing message, Governor
James Thompson stated that the law "affords the AIDS victims more protection
than current quarantine and isolation laws by requiring the Department of Pub-
lic Health to secure court approval before taking any intrusive actions such as
quarantine."' 167 A more skeptical viewpoint is that the existing law, which af-
fords the Department an almost unreviewable power to effectuate a quarantine,
would not withstand scrutiny under modem constitutional protections. Gover-
nor Thompson's view that the new law grants greater protection to HIV carriers
must be susbstantiated by documentation of recent successful quarantine actions
in instances of other infectious diseases. The passage of the new law may act as
a means to revive a long-dormant public health action.
Quarantine measures raise a range of exasperating questions. Commenta-
tors have suggested that because there is no medical cure for AIDS, quarantine
measures have the potential for lifetime commitment; individuals quarantined,
therefore, will likely be entitled to procedural due process protections requiring
that the state prove by more than a preponderance of the evidence that commit-
ment is justified. 168 Furthermore, a total quarantine of gay men would be
barred under even.a minimum review substantive due process analysis. Such a
quarantine would lack a reasonable relation to reducing infection, because not
all gay men have AIDS nor are all AIDS carriers gay. 169 The entire doctrine of
quarantine may lack the requisite rational relationship: its effectiveness depends
on the confinement of asymptomatic carriers of the virus who will never develop
the disease. CDC estimates that over 1,500,000 Americans have already been
exposed to the virus, and that 270,000 of these will develop the disease by
1991.170 The practical obstacles to the use of quarantine on this scale make the
rational relationship analysis inconsequential.
The first documented cases on AIDS-related quarantine have concerned the
isolation of AIDS carriers within prison populations. In Foy v. Owens' 7 , an
165. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1977). See People ex rel. Barmore v.
Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922) (Illinois Department of Health is empowered by the
state legislature to isolate persons who endanger the public health).
166. Act of Sept. 21, 1987, Ill. Pub. Act 85-651, § 7(a). Such quarantine must be either by
consent of the person to be isolated or the place to be quarantined, or by a court order upon clear
and convincing proof that the public health and welfare are significantly endangered and that "all
other reasonable means of correcting the problem have been exhausted and no less restrictive alter-
native exists." Id. § 7(b).
167. Letter from Gov. James R. Thompson to the Honorable Members of the Illinois Senate,
85th General Assembly (Sept. 21, 1987) (official signing message on enactment of Senate Bill 651).
168. Parmet, supra note 116, at 77-82 (analogizing AIDS quarantine to mental health
commitments).
169. Note, supra note 138, at 1282-83.
170. Redefining the Deadly Enemy, NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1987, at 65, col. 4.
171. No. 85-6909, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1986).
[Vol. 66
A CQ UIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
inmate of Holmsburg Prison in Pennsylvania sought a quarantine of all possible
AIDS carriers in the prison. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in dismissing the complaint, held that the plaintiff had
failed to meet the burden of demonstrating a threat of sexual assault with the
ensuing danger of contracting AIDS. 17 2 Although an inmate is constitutionally
protected from exposure to communicable diseases, 17 3 the imposition of a quar-
antine would have required a greater burden than the showing of the presence of
"possible" AIDS carriers. 174
In Cordero v. Coughlin,17 5 however, the court upheld a quarantine of diag-
nosed AIDS victims. The court dismissed the equal protection claims of in-
mates who had been diagnosed with AIDS, because AIDS sufferers are not a
suspect class; the inmates' due process claim was dismissed because prisoners
retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests. 176 Because the inmates
were diagnosed, the court found that procedural due process was satisfied, and
the quarantine was upheld as bearing a rational relationship to the protection of
the prison population. 177 In Powell v. Department of Correction 178 a quaran-
tined Oklahoma inmate who alleged the same protections under the equal pro-
tection clause did not have AIDS but had tested positive for the HIV virus. The
court upheld the quarantine as a reasonable means to achieve a legitimate state
purpose in light of the lesser protections accorded an inmate.
179
The prison cases may be seen as a particularized response to a specific situa-
tion. The imminent threat is a similar selective quarantine of "recalcitrant" gay
men. Notions about the profligate promiscuity of gay men influence many in
society to think of homosexual urges as uncontrollable,18 0 despite evidence of
self-behavior modification within the gay community.18 1 The first widely publi-
cized successful quarantine order involved a fourteen-year-old gay juvenile who
was confined to a Florida mental health ward to prevent him from spreading
AIDS.18 2 The juvenile, who did not have AIDS but had tested positive for the
HIV virus, was released by a court order after eleven days of confinement and
placed in the youth section of a community health center to await a hearing on a
state custody petition. Although the State Health Department conceded that
the State had made a mistake in seeking the quarantine order, it predicted that
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id. (citing Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d
373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977)).
174. Id.
175. 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
176. Id. at 10.
177. Id.
178. 647 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Okla. 1986).
179. Id. at 970-71. The court noted, however, that if the inmate were treated differently than
any other prisoner who was a known carrier of HIV virus-to which the court referred by its earlier
acronym HTLV 111-he would have suffered an equal protection violation. Id. at 971.
180. See, eg., Duncan, Commentary: Public Policy and the AIDS Epidemic, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 169, 171 (1986) (balancing justification for quarantine against human costs).
181. Update: AIDS in the San Francisco Cohort Study, supra note 72, at 573-78.
182. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1987, § B, at 9, col. 5.
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attempts to confine HIV carriers under state laws would continue.183 In future
cases, the modem emphasis on health as a matter of individual concern and
responsibility should prevail.184 The responsibility of prevention lies with each
individual's choice to engage in sexual activity and not with the conduct of his
partner. The individual must choose to control his own sexual behavior rather
than relying on the state to control the behavior of others.
C. AIDS and the Regulation of Sexual Activity
A state may choose to avoid the legal problems raised by quarantine meas-
ures by enacting measures restricting opportunities for sexual activity. A state
or municipality has the power to enact health, safety, and public nuisance stat-
utes to force the closing of establishments that threaten the general welfare of
the community.185 Under such statutes, the state does not have to establish that
the entire community will be affected by the nuisance so long as the nuisance is a
threat to the health and safety of those who come into contact with it in the
exercise of a public right.'8 6 Health and safety legislation is generally given
broad construction by courts, and such regulations will be limited only by provi-
sions of the federal and state constitutions.'
8 7
State and municipal attempts to restrict the spread of AIDS by regulating
"unsafe" sexual conduct in public buildings illustrate the range of the state's
power to regulate activity under health and safety ordinances. Complete closing
of an establishment as a public nuisance is only the broadest example of the use
of a state's power to regulate conduct on public premises. A bill introduced in
the 1984-85 session of the New Jersey Legislature' 88 proposed licensing of adult
bookstores by the State Department of Health. The bill, which died in commit-
tee hearings, would have required each entering patron to provide identification
which would be logged in a daily record to be made available to the Department
of Health on request; the owner of the adult bookstore would then be civilly
liable to any patron contracting AIDS or any other sexually transmitted disease
on the premises.
The city of Chattanooga, Tennessee, enacted an ordinance specifying that
the incidence of AIDS in the community required all viewing booths in "adult-
entertainment" theaters to be physically unobstructed and visible from the com-
mon area of the theater.'8 9 Upon challenge by bookstore proprietors in Broad-
way Books, Inc. v. Roberts,' 90 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee stated that the city's objective promoted a proper govern-
183. Id.
184. Parmet, supra note 116, at 75.
185. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 90 (5th ed. 1984).
186. Id.
187. Note, Preventing the Spread ofAIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses: A
Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 301, 309 (1985).
188. H.R. 4217, 1984-85 N.J. Legislature.
189. CHATTANOOGA, TENN., ORDINANCE 8601(14)(g) (1986).
190. 642 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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mental interest and upheld the statute as a regulation sufficiently narrow to
withstand a first amendment challenge. 19 1 When San Francisco public health
officials attempted to close fourteen gay bathhouses under the theory that they
facilitated the spread of AIDS, the California Superior Court interpreted the
ordinance as a prohibition of unsafe sexual activity on the premises.
1 92
Although the businesses were permitted to remain open, proprietors were re-
quired to distribute AIDS prevention pamphlets and to hire employees who
would monitor the establishment to assure compliance.193
In City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths,194 the New York Superior
Court validated a New York City ordinance1 95 which had been specifically
amended to allow selective closing, as public nuisances, of bathhouses and clubs
where allegedly unsafe sexual activity was practiced. When the bathhouse pro-
prietors argued for narrowing the interpretation of the statute, the court rejected
their arguments for the adoption of less restrictive alternatives as futile and
claimed that the legislative intent behind the public nuisance regulation required
expansive interpretation.
196
Despite the St. Mark's judge's emphasis on the "futility" of less restrictive
measures, four New York bathhouses remained in operation as of the summer of
1987.197 The four facilities promote safe-sex practices and employ "life guards"
to enforce the prohibition of unsafe activities. 198 City officials concede that they
do not know whether unsafe activity is, in fact, being practiced in "private"
areas of the clubs. 19 9 The State Health Commissioner justified the closing of the
New St. Mark's bathhouse as a public demonstration of public health officials'
concern because the closing raised the issue of transmission of the disease.
Stated the Commissioner, "[w]e feel that we have demonstrated the extent to
which public health should go.'"200 Attendance at the remaining New York City
bathhouses has increased nearly twenty-five percent from 1986 to 1987;201 but
the New St. Mark's bathhouse has not reopened.
Despite the fact the New York City ordinance succeeded only as a public
relations tool of the Department of Health, the Georgia General Assembly en-
acted a statute20 2 in 1986 declaring the operation of bathhouses to be harmful to
191. Id. at 490-92.
192. San Francisco ex. rel. Agnost v. Owen, No. 830-321 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Nov. 28,
1984) (unpublished opinion); see D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 151.
193. See D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 147-51, for a discussion of the controversy and political
infighting preceding this decision.
194. 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, aff'd, 122 App. Div. 2d 747, 505 N.Y.S.2d 1015
(1986); see also Georgia ex rel. Slaton v. Fleck & Assocs., 622 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (suit to
close Atlanta bathhouse remanded for failure to meet federal removal statute).
195. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 24.2 (1985).
196. St. Mark's, 130 Misc. 2d at 917-18, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 984 (arguing that the broad legislative
intent to prohibit the further transmission of AIDS required a rejection of strained or narrow inter-
pretation of the statute).
197. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1987, § 1, at 58, col. 1.
198. Id.
199. A "private area" in the clubs is any area enclosed by a door. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-11 (1986).
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the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The statute enabled the
state and local departments of health "to abate the operation of any bathhouses
as a public nuisance. ' 20 3 Furthermore, under the act, any owner or employee of
a bathhouse will be declared guilty of a misdemeanor.
2°4
The legal arguments against these ordinances were based on the right to
privacy under substantive due process and the first amendment right to free as-
sociation.20 5 In Broadway Books, San Francisco ex rel. Agnost v. Owen,206 and
St. Mark's it was conceded that the public health goals of the AIDS ordinances
at issue demonstrated a compelling government interest; the question raised by
the plaintiffs' complaints was directed to whether the level of protection of their
asserted rights mandated a requirement of least restrictive means. This issue was
most crucial in St. Mark's, in which the court did not attempt to narrow the
statute. Although it was suggested that strict scrutiny is required because bath-
houses themselves are not per se nuisances, 207 the New York court rejected
medical evidence that bathhouse closure would not affect the spiraling rate of
AIDS infection. According to the court, " '[i]t is not for the courts to determine
which scientific view is correct in ruling upon whether the police power has been
properly exercised.' ",208 This indicates that the courts need not even inquire
whether the nuisance closure is an effective, let alone necessary, means to
achieve a legitimate state purpose when impaired individual rights are not
protected.
Had Hardwick upheld the right to engage in consensual sodomy, the funda-
mental right of privacy would have extended to intimate conduct in one's
home.209 The privacy protection does not extend to commercial establishments
simply because they provide an opportunity for intimate sexual behavior.
210
One court, in a blunt but colorful statement, observed that "[w]e decline to hold
that the right to unobserved masturbation in a public theatre is 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ",211
Additionally, state police powers have been held to eclipse first amendment
rights of association when the nature of the assemblage is not for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas but for entertainment and gratification. 212 Social as-
sociations do not come under the core protection of the first amendment. 213
Although some members of the gay community believe that the history of sexual
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states in part: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging... the right of the people peaceably to assemble .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I,
206. No. 830-321 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1984) (unpublished opinion).
207. Note, supra note 187, at 314.
208. St. Mark's, 130 Misc. 2d at 917, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (quoting Chiropractice Ass'n. of New
York, Inc. v. Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 114, 187 N.E.2d 756, 757, 237 N.Y.S. 2d 289, 291 (1962)).
209. For a discussion of Hardwick, see supra notes 74-101 and accompanying text.
210. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1974).
211. Ellwest Stereo Theatres v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
212. People v. Morone, 150 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 22, 198 Cal. Rptr. 316, 318 (1983) (uphold-
ing closure of a heterosexual "swing club").
213. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1195 (D.C. Conn.
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repression elevates the practice of homosexual sexual activity to the status of a
political act,214 it is unlikely that any court will accept this argument. A similar
argument by gay health officials that closure of gay bathhouses would sever their
ability to reach individuals most in need of AIDS education, however, reaches
the protected core of association for belief and ideas, and may have influenced
the California court's decision to allow the San Francisco bathhouse to remain
open.
215
Opponents of bathhouse and bookstore closings are not necessarily striving
to legitimize sexual establishments. Their arguments are based on the fear that
AIDS will be utilized to restrict all gay organizations with political or social
functions. Such fears may be well-grounded in an era when gay rights are
threatened by the public fear of AIDS.2 16 To dismiss the argument that such
closings are a prelude to more ominous restrictions is to ignore the earlier lesson
learned from the quarantine of prostitutes. That quarantine followed the failure
of the closure of red light districts, such as Storyville and the Barbary Coast, to
restrict the spread of venereal disease.
21 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Ironically, AIDS has appeared at the very time when society was making
tentative steps towards recognition of the rights of sexual minorities. If there
were no AIDS crisis, the gay community would be concentrating on the achieve-
ment of greater recognition of its rights instead of struggling to preserve the few
conceded protections.
The epidemic is still at the stage in which it is largely defined by the pos-
sibilities that loom ahead. Although AIDS has been in the forefront of national
issues for the better part of the decade, the Reagan Administration only began to
make tentative steps in confronting the epidemic on the eve of the Third Interna-
tional Conference on AIDS, which convened in Washington, D.C. in June 1987.
Addressing the American Foundation for AIDS Research, President Reagan, in
his first statement on AIDS, called for "urgency, not panic" in combatting the
epidemic and "compassion, not blame" for the victims. 2 18 Yet, his proposal for
effective restriction of the transmission of the disease consisted solely of the im-
plementation of a wide range of testing for the HIV virus at the state and federal
levels.
2 19
As noted above, the legislative and judicial responses to the AIDS epidemic
1974) (private club held exempt from Civil Rights Act barring racial discrimination in public
accommodations).
214. See, e.g., D. BLACK, supra note 27, at 135 (discussing belief that the exercise of the freedom
to perform homosexual acts was motivation for some gay men to patronize bathhouses); see also
Fitzgerald, The Castro-I1, THE NEW YORKER, July 28, 1986, at 44-63 (discussing the belief of gay
leaders that the bathhouses symbolized gay freedom).
215. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 151.
216. Note, supra note 138, at 1286.
217. A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 73-75.
218. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1987, § A, at 1, col 2.
219. President Reagan's testing proposal is seen as an indication of his partiality to the views of
William Bennett, his Secretary of Education, who favors mandatory testing for the HIV virus, over
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are still in the seminal stage. No one is willing to predict the ultimate outcome
of society's attempts to restrict the advance of the epidemic. Yet, there are sig-
nificant omens that warrant the growing concern in the gay community. De-
spite publicity about the increasing threat to the heterosexual community, the
majority of AIDS victims are still homosexual men. As discussed above, there is
much evidence that the public still perceives AIDS as a gay disease; therefore,
many people perceive the threat of AIDS as a threat from the gay community.
Efforts that demonstrate compassion for the victims of contagious diseases
220
are frequently offset by a rash of irresponsible and ineffective proposals that fur-
ther victimize the diseased. 22 1 The current calls for mandatory AIDS testing
have increased anxiety among gays who perceive such measures to be a surro-
gate marker for their homosexuality.222 This identification is frightening when
the possibilities of quarantine and regulation of sexual behavior loom ahead.
223
After the Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick, homosexuals question whether
the legal system will afford them any protections should the threat of such re-
strictions become imminent. Furthermore, the issue of the individual liberties of
homosexuals is critical to all AIDS victims, who are likely to be subject to the
same treatment as gays in a society that identifies the disease with a particular
sexual practice. In the future, gays will not be able to rely on the safety of "the
closet" to ensure the preservation of their rights. Self-preservation in the gay
community depends not only on protections from the fatal virus but on the abil-
ity to persuade courts and legislatures to distinguish the reality of the disease
from the metaphors that surround it.
THOMAS R. MENDICINO
the views of Dr. C. Everett Koop, his Surgeon General, who believes that only a voluntary testing
program can be effective. See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1987, § A, at 20, col. 1.
Representative Henry Waxman, responding to the imminent implementation of widespread
testing, introduced a bill mandating confidentiality of HIV-antibody test results. H.R. 3071, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); see also H.R. 2773, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (requiring confidentiality of
medical records of AIDS patients). The bill would also make it illegal to discriminate "against an
otherwise qualified individual in employment, housing, public accommodations, or governmental
services, solely by reason of the fact that such individual is, or is regarded as being, infected" with
the HIV virus. H.R. 3071, supra. However, the Reagan Administration's Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Otis Bowen, announced that the Administration would oppose the bill, stating that
individual states should be free to adopt or reject civil rights laws without federal intervention. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
220. See, e.g., School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987) (Federal Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 forbids discrimination against persons with contagious diseases; although
plaintiff in the case suffered from tuberculosis, the opinion set forth a protective analysis that will
have implications for the employment status of persons with AIDS).
221. See supra notes 144-67 and accompanying text.
222. See A. BRANDT, supra note 23, at 197 (discussing further implications of HIV testing in
which individuals fear not only isolation and quarantine, but the use of test results as a license to
discriminate in employment, housing, and the availability of health and life insurance).
223. See Buckley, Identify all the Carriers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1986, § A, at 27, col. 4 (arguing
for universal mandatory screening in which individuals testing positive would be tatooed on their
forearms and buttocks).
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